FROM HOMOOUSION TO HOMOHYPOSTATON: PATRIARCH METHODIUS OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND POST-PATRISTIC TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

This article attempts to demonstrate that the ninth-century patriarch Methodius of Constantinople undertook a radical deconstruction of the conceptual framework of traditional Trinitarian theology, which resulted in the subversion of all recognisable differences between the second and the third person of the Trinity. It consists of three parts: a detailed analysis of a Trinitarian excursus in Methodius’ Life of the Iconophile confessor Euthymius of Sardes, which pays close attention to terminological and syntactical ambiguities; a comparison of this excursus with similar discussions by other authors of the time; and the identification of developments in the Late Antique theological discourse that can explain Methodius’ particular understanding of the Trinity. Following decades of bitter controversy the Second Ecumenical Council declared in 381 that the Christian God was three persons sharing one common divinity. This formula proved to be a lasting success and eventually came to be recognised by all Christian communities. By contrast, the conceptual framework that explained and justified it fared much less well: based on a highly complex and idiosyncratic combination of disparate philosophical notions, it caused great difficulties to later theologians who struggled to make sense of it.1 In the sixth century this obscurity resulted in a new controversy when theologians such as John Philoponus proposed a ‘Tritheistic’ interpretation of the Trinity and the defenders of the traditional view either fell into the ‘Sabellian’ trap or tried to 1 Contemporary scholarship has proposed several conflicting interpretations. Cf. the most recent interpretation by J. Zachhuber, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa. Philosophical Background and Theological Significance (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 46; Leiden, Boston, Cologne,

Following decades of bitter controversy the Second Ecumenical Council declared in 381 that the Christian God was three persons sharing one common divinity.This formula proved to be a lasting success and eventually came to be recognised by all Christian communities.By contrast, the conceptual framework that explained and justified it fared much less well: based on a highly complex and idiosyncratic combination of disparate philosophical notions, it caused great difficulties to later theologians who struggled to make sense of it. 1n the sixth century this obscurity resulted in a new controversy when theologians such as John Philoponus proposed a 'Tritheistic' interpretation of the Trinity and the defenders of the traditional view either fell into the 'Sabellian' trap or tried to solve the problem by mere fiat. 2 Tritheism was finally overcome both in the Monophysite and in the Chalcedonian churches (although with questionable success), but this does not mean that Trinitarian speculation came to an end.In a previous publication I have argued that it was alive and well in the seventh century when Leontius of Jerusalem proposed a radical reinterpretation of the inner-Trinitarian relations through substitution of the conventional essentialist and static framework with a new voluntaristic and developmental one. 3In this article I will attempt to show that the discussion continued into the eighth and ninth centuries.These centuries are even less well studied than the immediately preceding period and there has been a tendency to focus on creedal statements and to assume that these statements express the views of the authors who quoted them. 4It goes without saying that this approach is methodologically unsound.Creedal formulae are shibboleths of orthodoxy and can therefore not be taken as evidence that their content was truly accepted or even understood.For a proper evaluation of an author's views on the Trinity we must instead look at passages where he presents his views in the form of an argument and we must analyse his statements as carefully as those of authors of the fourth and fifth centuries instead of being satisfied with superficial readings.
In what follows I will focus on Methodius of Syracuse, a monk and patriarchal deacon in Constantinople who rose to prominence as one of the leaders of the resistance against official Iconoclasm in the early ninth century and who as patriarch was later responsible for the restoration of the cult of images in the Orthodox Church. 5Methodius was not only a church politician but also a prolific author of saints' lives and religious poems.I have written elsewhere about his anthropological speculations, arguing that they are highly original reinterpretations of Patristic concepts with the aim of making these concepts relevant in the radically changed world of the Early Middle Ages. 6Now I hope to show that his views on the Trinity are no less original and that he embarks on a radical deconstruction of the conceptual framework of traditional Trinitarian theology, which results in the subversion of all recognisable differences between the second and the third person of the Trinity.In order to make my case I will analyse a passage in a Trinitarian excursus in Methodius' Life of the Iconophile confessor Euthymius of Sardes, establish the function of this passage within its context, compare Methodius' treatment of the topic with similar discussions by other authors of the time, and identify developments in the Late Antique theological discourse that can explain his particular understanding of the Trinity.
I have chosen to start with the in-depth analysis of just a few lines of text because Methodius is an extremely demanding author.His intentions reveal themselves only to the attentive reader who is prepared to fill the gaps in his often incomplete statements. 7This task is not made any easier by the way in which Methodius presents his argument.It could be said that he was the Heidegger of his time: he coins new words or uses existing words in unexpected ways and he deliberately creates ambiguity at the syntactical and lexicographical levels. 8In what follows I have attempted to make my case without involving these features so as not to encumber the discussion with long digressions, but it has not always been possible to exclude them altogether.

I.
The passage in the Life of Euthymius of Sardes that I have chosen as my starting point is part of an excursus about the divine image in man, which is presented in the form of an exegesis of Genesis 1:26. 9Methodius starts from the traditional view that the divine image in man is to be identified with his logikov n but then adds that the formula kat' eij kov na in Genesis 1:26 must not be understood as referring solely to the Word as the second person of the Trinity. 10This rejection of a well-established interpretation of the verse is based on the following considerations.Firstly there is the grammatical argument that the pronoun hJ metev ran and the verb poihv swmen do not refer to two persons but at least to three,11 and secondly Methodius reasons that if man were merely logikov ~ he would only be the image of the second person of the Trinity, which cannot exist on its own, and supports this contention with the observation that in man, too, the lov go~ cannot function without the 'mind' (nou' ~) from which it issues forth and the 'drawing of breath' (aj eriv a oJ lkhv ), which accompanies it.12With this comparison Methodius introduces the concept of the Imago Trinitatis, which sees Father, Son and Spirit and their relations with each other reflected in the human mind, word and breath. 13his concept, which had already been employed by Gregory of Nazianzus, 14 was very popular in the late Patristic discourse and is regularly found in authors such as Anastasius of Antioch, Maximus the Confessor, Anastasius of Sinai and John of Damascus. 15In Methodius' case its adaptation results in a shift in the meaning of the terms logikov n and lov go~: whereas in Late Antique Christian texts the two words had denoted 'rationality' and 'reason', Methodius understands logikov n in its etymological sense as 'wordliness', 16 and he identifies the human lov go~ with the 'uttered word' (proforiko; ~ lov go~). 17This re-interpretation has repercussions for the divine archetype: by linking the distinctions between the three divine persons to articulated speech and by discussing them in the context of creation Methodius gives the impression that these distinctions are bound up with the divine operations ad extra, which implies a modalist understanding of the Trinity.
While being of questionable orthodoxy, such a position would still be well within the parameters of the Late Antique Christian discourse.However, detailed analysis of one sentence within the excursus shows that this is not Methodius' last word on the topic and that he aims at subverting the very framework on which traditional Trinitarian theology is based: aj lla; tiv fhsin hJ grafhv , ma' llon de; oJ qeo; ~ kai; pathv r: poihv swmen a[ nqrwpon kat' eij kov na hJ metev ran kai; kaq' oJ moiv wsin; e[ cei ga; r aj lhqw' ~ oJ a[ nqrwpo~ to; kat' eij kov na dia; tou' logikou' wJ ~ ej k tou' qeou' lov gou dhmiourghqei; ~ logikw' ~, o{ per logiko; n aj lhqev stata cwri; ~ nou' tou' wJ ~ patro; ~ kai; aj eriv a~ oJ lkh' ~ th' ~ wJ ~ pneuv mato~ kaqa; e[ famen ou[ te kinei' tai ou[ t' ej nergei' pwv pote ej peidh; kai; oJ dhmiourgo; " qeo; " lov go" ej k nou' tou' patro; " probev blhtai kai; eij " zwopoiv hsin tw' n aJ pav ntwn ej gnwv ristai wJ " sundhmiourgo; n patri; kai; uiJ w' / o{ per ei| " qeo; " su; n tw' / patri; kai; tw' / uiJ w' / wJ molov ghtai. 18ut why does Scripture or rather the God and Father say: 'Let us make man according to our image and according to our likeness'?For man has indeed the (sc.status of being) according to the image through his 'wordliness' as having been created by the God Word in a 'wordly' manner, which 'wordliness', as we have said, neither moves nor operates at any time without the mind as father and the drawing of breath as spirit, since the creator God Word, too, is projected from the mind, that is, the Father, and recognised is for the vivification of all things as being co-creator with the Father and the Son that which is confessed as one God with the Father and the Son. 19is sentence consists of two parts, a main clause and a subordinate clause introduced by the conjunction ej peidhv .The main clause merely sums up the results of the previous discussion.By contrast, the subordinate clause introduces an aspect that Methodius had not yet set out in detail, namely the inner-Trinitarian relations that provide the starting point for the divine image in man.At this point one would expect a straightforward exposé of Trinitarian theology.However, this is not what Methodius presents us with.When one reads the sentence for the first time one immediately recognises several oddities.The subordinate clause starts as a statement about the Word and then switches to the Spirit but in such a way that this shift is not immediately obvious.The second verb, ej gnwv ristai, follows the first, probev blhtai, with which it is correlated, without any reference to a new subject and a reader will assume that it still refers back to lov go~, in particular since both verbs are used in the third person singular of the perfect passive.That we are dealing with a new subject only becomes clear when we read beyond ej gnwv ristai and even then this subject is not named but can only be inferred by a process of exclusion: once we come across the Dative uiJ w' / we know that we are dealing with a third entity beside the Father and the Son, which our knowledge of the Christian creed then causes us to identify with the Holy Spirit.There can be no doubt that this ambiguity is created deliberately: nothing would have been easier than to insert a subject to; a{ gion pneu' ma either immediately before or immediately after eij ~ zwopoiv hsin tw' n aJ pav ntwn ej gnwv ristai.
Indeed, further analysis reveals that Methodius creates ambiguity not only through misleading syntax but also through the use of equivocal individual expressions.The most obvious oddity is the verb probev blhtai, which defines the relationship between the Father and the Word through comparison with the relationship between 'mind' (nou`) and 'uttered word' (lov go~ proforikov ~) in a human being.The verb probav llein fits well into this context since it can have the meaning 'to utter' and is thus synonymous with profev rein, 20 This is evident not only from numerous Late Antique and Byzantine theological texts,21 but also from Methodius' Encomium of Agatha where he defines 'words' (lov goi) as 'projections of thoughts' (nohmav twn problhv mata). 22When we look at the context of the sentence under discussion we find that 'projection' is not the only way in which this relationship is conceptualised because Methodius also speaks of the mind as the 'begetter' (gennhv twr) of the word. 23Such mixing of metaphors was common enough at the time: Photius, for example, once castigates the Monophysites as 'begetters of outlandish … projections' (ej kfuv lwn ... problhmav twn gennhv tore"). 24As long as we limit the discussion to the human sphere Methodius' statement thus seems to be entirely appropriate.However, it must be remembered that probev blhtai appears in a specifically Trinitarian context where it denotes the relation between the Father and the Son.Early Christian authors such as Justin or Eusebius used genna' n and probav llein interchangeably in their discussions of the relationship between Father and Son, evidently prompted by the Johannine appellation 'Word' for the Son. 25 This unselfconscious use of the two terms, however, came to an end in the later fourth century when the status of the Spirit became an issue.From then on the verb probav llein denotes exclusively the procession of the Spirit from the Father whereas the relationship between Father and Son is unequivocally expressed through genna' n.Gregory of Nazianzus, for example, states that there is 'the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: the one being generator and projector … and the others either product of generation or product of projection' (oJ path; r kai; oJ uiJ o; " kai; to; a{ gion pneu' ma: oJ me; n gennhv twr kai; proboleuv " ... tw' n de; to; me; n gev nnhma to; de; prov blhma). 26Later Patristic authors simply repeat this formula, which by then had become fossilised,27 both in creedal statements and also in the particular context of the Imago Trinitatis. 28This remarkable terminological consistency is, of course, not accidental: it is demanded by orthodox Trinitarian theology.The Cappadocians had conceptualised the Trinity as one substance in three hypostases and had defined hypostasis as 'substance with idioms' (ouj siv a meta; ij diwmav twn). 29Accordingly, it was essential to distinguish the idioms clearly from each other and to avoid terminological ambiguities.Patristic theologians therefore took pains to emphasise the difference between the second and the third person of the Trinity even when Scripture appears to use the same terms to express their relation with the first person.The sixth-century author Anastasius of Antioch, for example, states in his first Dogmatic Exposition: mh; qaumav zwmen de; lev gonto~ tou' kuriv ou e[ xodon aj po; tou' patro; ~ th; n eJ katev rou prov odon: ej gw; gav r, fhsin, ej k tou' patro; ~ ej xh' lqon kai; h{ kw, kai; pav lin: to; pneu' ma o} para; tou' patro; ~ ej kporeuv etai: kai; ga; r kai; to; ej xelqei' n kai; to; ej kporeuqh' nai tauj to; n ej ntau' qa shmaiv nei, tw' / pneuv mati gou' n th; n ej kpov reusin ma' llon kat' ej xaiv reton h{ rmosen w{ sper eJ autw' / th; n gev nnhsin. 30t us not wonder that the Lord called 'exit' the coming forth of either person from the Father, for he says: 'I have come out of the father and am come', and again: 'the Spirit, which comes from the Father'.Here 'coming out' and 'having come out' mean the same thing.Yet he rather attributed 'coming out' specifically to the Spirit, just as 'birth' to himself.
It is evident that Methodius takes exactly the opposite approach when he gives the Son a characteristic that had for hundreds of years been reserved for the Spirit but it is not yet clear why he should have done so.One possible explanation would be to assume a lapsus calami in particular since Methodius was, of course, aware of the 'correct' version: in the Life of Euthymius he speaks of the 'inconfoundibility of the persons' (to; aj suv gcuton tw' n proswv pwn), 31 and in his Passio of Denys he lets the saint profess his faith in 'a Father … the ingenerate, a Son, alone generate … and a Spirit that proceeds from the Father' (patev ra ... to; n aj gev nhton uiJ o; n gennhto; n mov non ... kai; pneu' ma to; proi> o; n ej k patev ro"). 32However, such an explanation cannot account for the deliberately ambiguous syntax and it is also gainsaid by further equivocation at the level of individual expressions. 3329 For later references cf.Thalassius the Libyan, Centuriae, IV.88, PG 91, 1468B: uJ pov stasin de; oJ riv zousin ouj siv an meta; ij diwmav twn, identified as patrov th", uiJ ov th" and ej kpov reusi"; Theodore of Stoudios, Antirretici, I.1, PG 99, 329B. 30Anastasius of Antioch, Expositio dogmatica, I.1.27,ed.Sakkos, p. 25, ll.3-8. 31Methodius, Life of Euthymius of Sardes, 33, ed.Gouillard, p. 69, ll.674-75. 32Methodius, Encomium of Denys, 10, ed.J. C. Westerbrink, Passio S. Dionysii Areopagitae Rustici et Eleutherii uitgegeven naar het Leidse Handschrift Vulcanianus 52 (Alphen, 1937), p. 54, ll.21-25. 33Further study may well reveal that Methodius' views are not as idiosyncratic as they might first seem.The eleventh-century theologian and spiritual author Nicetas Stethatos deals in his writings extensively with the Imago Trinitatis and expresses ideas that are strikingly similar to what we have found in Methodius.Nicetas' treatise De anima, for example, contains in chapter 24 a passage where the soul is characterised as 'having a mind as its purest part, father and projector of the word' (nou' n e[ cousa mev ro~ auj th' ~ to; kaqarwv taton patev ra kai; probolev a tou' lov gou), ed.J. Darrouzès, Nicétas Stéthatos, Opuscules et lettres (Sources Chrétiennes, 81, Paris, 1961), p. 86, ll.6-7.This statement contains two oddities: firstly, there is no reference to the Spirit, and secondly the term proboleuv ~, which traditionally defined the relationship between the first and That such equivocation is not limited to probev blhtai becomes obvious when we turn to the part of the sentence that seems to refer to the Holy Spirit.After probev blhtai one might expect a similar verb to express the way in which the Spirit is related to the Father, as is indeed often found in Patristic texts in statements such as 'from the Father the Son has been born and the Spirit goes out' (ej k tou' patro; ~ oJ uiJ o; ~ gegev nnhtai kai; to; pneu' ma ej kporeuv etai). 34Had Methodius opted for such a straightforward statement the implications of an attribution of probolhv to the Word would immediately have become evident to his readers.Instead, he chooses to employ the verb gnwriv zein, which while being correlated with probev blhtai and also appearing in the perfect passive, does not denote an inner-Trinitarian relation.However, this does not mean that there is no connection between the two words; for ej gnwv ristai conjures up the concept of 'characteristic property' (gnwristikh; ij diov th~), which permits the recognition of the divine persons as distinct entities. 35Since the second part of the sentence seems to identify the subject of ej gnwv ristai as the Spirit, contemporary readers would surely have been reminded that one of the terms to denote this 'mark' (gnwv risma) in the case of the Spirit is 'projection' (probolhv , probav llesqai), which as we have seen has just been applied to the Word.Therefore one can argue that Methodius chose this verb in order to indicate in a rather more oblique way that he deviated from the earlier Patristic consensus with its insistence that the characteristic idioms of each person are not communicable or interchangeable. 36oreover, it must be recognised that the prepositional phrase eij ~ zwopoiv hsin tw' n aJ pav ntwn is ambiguous.While in many texts the Holy Spirit is called 'lifethe third persons of the Trinity, is used alongside pathv r to characterise the relationship between the first and second persons of the Trinity. 34Pseudo-Athanasius, Dialogi duo contra Macedonianos, PG 28, 1304C. 35Cf. e.g.Emperor Justinian, Contra Monophysitas, 180, ed.E. Schwartz, Drei dogmatische Schriften Iustinians (Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophischhistorische Abteilung, NF, 18; Munich, 1939), p. 39, l. 6: ta; ~ gnwristika; ~ ij diov thta~.
36 This interpretation can be substantiated when we also take into consideration the prepositional phrase eij " zwopoiv hsin tw' n aJ pav ntwn.The syntax requires that it refer to the verb ej gnwv ristai, which it precedes.However, the construction is decidedly odd as can be seen from the translation 'is recognised for the purpose of vivifying all things' (this problem is glossed over by Gouillard who translates: 'a été révélé pour la vivification de l'univers').Indeed, when Greek authors use this verb they invariably construe it with a dative or with a prepositional phrase.Here I will only give two examples: Gregory of Nazianzus states in his twenty-third Oratio that we conceptualise God as 'one and the same … nature, which is recognised through eternity and birth and procession' (miv an kai; th; n auj thv n ... fuv sin qeov thto" aj nav rcw/ kai; gennhv sei kai; proov dw/ gnwrizomev nhn), cf.above note 12; and the author of the Pseudo-Cyrillian treatise De sancta trinitate avers that 'the father is characterised by and recognised from his having a Son' (oJ path; r ej k tou' e[ cein uiJ o; n carakthriv zetai kai; gnwriv zetai), cf.Pseudo-Cyril, De sancta trinitate, PG 77, 1149C.In order to make sense of Methodius' sentence we therefore need to supply such an element to which the prepositional phrase eij " zwopoiv hsin tw' n aJ pav ntwn would then refer.This could have been 'to be', but it could equally have been 'to project', which is after all the characteristic property of the Spirit.Accordingly one could add ej k tou' probeblh' sqai or tw' / probeblh' sqai to eij " zwopoiv hsin tw' n aJ pav ntwn ej gnwv ristai and thus arrive at the reading 'has been recognised by its having been projected for the purpose of vivifying all things', which drives home the point that the verb probav llein, which has just been applied to the Son, is usually reserved for the Spirit.
giving' (zwopoiov n), vivification was not considered to be a characteristic of the third person of the Trinity alone.The Old Testament contains passages such as II Esdras 19:5: 'You are yourself the only Lord: you have made the heaven and … the earth … and you vivify everything' (su; ei\ auj to; ~ kuv rio~ mov no~: su; ej poiv hsa~ to; n ouj rano; n kai; ... th; n gh' n ... kai; su; zw/ opoiei' ~ ta; pav nta), 37 which Patristic authors interpreted as referring to all three divine persons and therefore to the divine nature.Cyril of Alexandria, for example, asserts in his Commentary on the Gospel of John that 'the creator of all things vivifies … all things since he is life by nature' (zwogonei' ... ta; pav nta zwh; kata; fuv sin uJ pav rcwn oJ pav ntwn dhmiourgov ~), 38 and Anastasius of Antioch speaks even more explicitly of God as 'life and living and vivifying substance' (hJ zwh; kai; zw' sa kai; zwopoio; ~ ouj siv a). 39For this reason the champions of the full divinity of the Spirit in the late fourth century regularly refer to this operation in their attempts to 'prove' its consubstantiality with the Father and the Son.Accordingly the Spirit can be identified not only as sundhmiourgov n but also as suzwopoiov n as it is indeed by Cyril of Alexandria who calls it 'co-creating and co-vivifying' (sugktiv zon kai; suzwopoiou' n). 40his argument can be taken even further.In those instances in the New Testament where vivification is mentioned in combination with 'spirit' this spirit is identified not with the third but with the second person of the Trinity.This is explicitly stated in I Corinthians 15:45 where the formula 'vivifying spirit' (pneu' ma zwopoiov n) refers to the incarnated Son as the 'last Adam' (e[ scato~ j Adav m), 41 and is certainly also the most obvious reading of John 6:63 and II Corinthians 3:6 where the spirit is juxtaposed with the flesh or the letter. 42The use of this formula in the context thus does not only not introduce a specific operation of the Spirit but also reminds the readers that the name 'spirit' (pneu' ma) itself is not exclusively used to denote the third person of the Trinity since Scripture teaches both that 'God is spirit' (pneu' ma oJ qeov ~) and that 'the Lord is the spirit' (oJ kuv rio~ to; pneu' mav ej stin). 43ne could even argue that Methodius' refusal to insert an explicit reference to the third person of the Trinity is meant to highlight the fact that there is not a single term that can be exclusively attributed to it.Here, too, his approach is diametrically opposed to that of other theologians: Anastasius of Antioch had been forced to concede that all three persons can be called both 'holy' and 'spirit' but had then insisted that the combination of the two terms is only found in the case of the third person of the Trinity. 44t this point we can conclude that in the first part of the subordinate clause Methodius has constructed a statement that ambiguates attributes of divine persons and thus erodes the conceptual framework on which traditional Trinitarian theology was based.As we have seen he creates a context where all specific markers of the third person of the Trinity, its name, its operation and its mode of existence, are attributed, either explicitly or through implication, to the second person of the Trinity. 45.
The argument that has been presented so far has been based on the unstated assumption that Methodius' attempts at ambiguation are limited to the Spirit and do not affect the Word Son.However, is this really the case?Here we need to consider that a statement such as oJ lov go~ ... probev blhtai can only be interpreted as referring to the second person if we accept that a 'name' is more unequivocal than a characteristic property.However, from the allusion to I Corinthians 15:45 we can conclude that this is not so in the case of the Spirit, and Methodius offers us no reason why we should consider this to be different in the case of the Word or Son.Accordingly we can argue that the term Word could also refer to the third person of the Trinity, which is 'projected' from the Father.
In order to substantiate this hypothesis I will look more closely at the verb wJ molov ghtai, the third perfect passive after probev blhtai and ej gnwv ristai.This verb will initially be taken to mean 'is agreed' or 'is confessed' and will conjure up the phrase 'confession of faith' (oJ mologiv a th' ~ piv stew~), 46 in particular since the subject appears to be 'one God' (ei| ~ qeov ~).However, here one needs to consider that it occurs in a context which is saturated with composita containing the element oJ mo-, such as oJ moduv namo~, oJ moouv sio~, and oJ mofuhv ". 47 I would argue that by creating this cluster Methodius signals to his readers that oJ mologei' n is morphologically similar to such words and that he thus alerts them to the existence of the adjective oJ molov go~.Such an interpretation may seem far-fetched but here we need to take into account a dimension of Methodius' texts that I have already mentioned at the beginning of this article, namely that words are not used in their 44 Anastasius, Expositio dogmatica, I.1.60-61,ed.Sakkos, p. 35, ll.19-29. 45Such a reading is further insinuated to the reader by the fact that it would make much better sense to take ej k nou' tou' patro; " probev blhtai ... eij " zwopoiv hsin tw' n aJ pav ntwn together as one statement.Of course, such a reading is ruled out by the presence of the copula kaiv but readers cannot help but notice that it would be much more 'natural' than the one required by the syntax.This is not the only case of such an oddity in the text, cf.Gouillard, 'Vie d'Euthyme', p. 69, note 134. 46Cf. e.g.conventional sense but given meanings that are suggested by the components of which they are made up. 48or the sake of brevity I will mention only one example here, which comes from a passage in Methodius' Encomium of Agatha, where the posthumous activity of the saint is described.There Methodius tells his audience that the martyr has reddened her face and her dress with the blood of the lamb 'in order to flood the dyes of fresh colour towards others who approach her' (i{ na ... qalasseuv h/ toi' " prosercomev noi" eJ tev roi" ta; " th' " euj croiv bafav "). 49The curious expression qalasseuv h/ ... bafav ~ is otherwise unattested but there exists a verb qalassobafeiǹ, which means 'to dye purple'. 50There can be no doubt that Methodius derived qalasseuv h/ ... bafav ~ from this verb because in the same context he uses the synonymous aJ libafiv a in its conventional sense, 'dyeing purple', and the unequivocal term porfuv rwsi~. 51Here we thus have a case where Methodius deconstructs a term and uses its constituent parts in their literal meaning.This gives an idea of the complexity of his texts and goes at least some way to showing that a derivation of wJ molov ghtai from a form oJ molov go~ is indeed possible. 52hat would be the purpose of such manipulation in the excursus in the Life of Euthymius?Even if wJ molov ghtai is formally similar to other compounds with oJ mothere is, of course, a crucial difference: the other terms refer to the common divinity, which confers on each of the three divine persons not only the same ouj siv a and 48 This finds its explanation in the great importance of lexicography and etymology for the theological discourse of the seventh to ninth centuries.The author of an anonymous sermon on the Annunciation, for example, employs arguments based on etymology and frequently borrows technical terms from the etymological discourse, cf.e.g.Pseudo-Athanasius, Sermon on the Annuncation, 3, PG 28, 921A: ij siv a lev getai kat' ej tumologiv an troph' / tou' i eij ~ o, kai; pleonasmw' / tou' u stoiceiv ou ouj siv a diermhneuv etai.It is suggestive that one etymological lexicon of the ninth century is attributed to an author named Methodius, cf.R. Reitzenstein, 'Zu den Quellen des sogenannten Etymologicum magnum.2) Das etymologische Werk des Methodios', Philologos 49 (1890), pp.400-420. 49Methodius, Encomium of Agatha, 3, ed.Mioni, p. 78, ll.10-11. 50Cf.e.g.Philo of Byzantium, 2, ed.K. Brodersen, Reiseführer zu den Sieben Weltwundern.Philon von Byzanz und andere antike Texte (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1992), p. 26: a[ llwn de; porfuriv zei to; crw' ma kai; toi' " dia; kogculiv wn qalassobafoumev nai" ej xomoiou' tai. 51Methodius, Encomium of Agatha, 3, ed.Mioni, p. 78, ll.3-4: aJ libafiv a/ ... th; n ej sqhta ... foiniv ssousa, and p. 78, ll.9-10: th/ pollh/ ej picrwv sei th` porfurwv sew~.
52 Indeed the same passage contains an even closer parallel to the excursus in the Life of Euthymius in the characterisation of Agatha's red dress as ej xomologikh; stolhv , cf.Encomium of Agatha, 3, ed.Mioni, p. 78, l. 10.This phrase, which is evidently inspired by Biblical phrases such as ej xomolov ghsin ... ej neduv sw in Psalm 103:2, is virtually untranslatable: it could refer to Agatha's status as a 'confessor' (oJ mologhv tria), cf.Encomium of Agatha, 25, ed.Mioni, p. 89, l. 14: ej k qelhv matov " mou ej xomologhv somai auj tw' / ; but it could also have the meaning 'promise', cf.Encomium of Agatha, 33, ed.Mioni, p. 92, ll.36-37: kai; e[ cei hJ ej xomolov ghsi" -wJ " oJ ra' te -th; n e[ ktisin kai; lev lutai to; crev o" moi aj pev nqen, and would then refer to God's promise to the martyrs to give them a full reward in Revelation 6:11, which is there accompanied by the gift of a stolhv .Moreover, Methodius does not use the regular adjective ej xomologhtikhv but instead employs the otherwise unattested form ej xomologikhv , which suggests to the reader that it is derived from logikov ~ and which thus introduces a third theme, namely that in the case of Agatha the colour of the dress takes the place of 'words' (rJ hv mata) as a means of communciation with the faithful, cf.Encomium of Agatha, 3, ed.Mioni, p. 78, ll.11-12: th' / tw' n rJ hmav twn aj nelleipei' oj cethgiv a/ auj th' ". fuv si~ but also the same duv nami~, while lov go~ evidently belongs to the hypostatic sphere.A claim, however, that the third person of the Trinity is lov go" in the same way as the second person is lov go~ can only lead to further erosion of the accepted Trinitarian framework. 53n order to substantiate this hypothesis we need to return one more time to the terms that Methodius uses in the excursus in order to express consubstantiality: there we not only find the term oJ moouv sion but also tautoouv sion and tautoousiov th~, 54 which suggests not only that the two terms are interchangeable but also that the two elements oJ moand tautoare equivalent.That this is indeed the case can be seen from a passage in Methodius' Life of Theophanes: tov te dh; prosomologei` auj th/ euj quv mw~ kai; aj nafqev ggetai eij pwv n: aj po; tou` nuǹ aj lhqinh; kai; gnhsiv a suv mbiov ~ mou ei\ su; w\ kuriv a kai; aj delfh; koinwnov ~ te tou` biv ou kai; nuǹ kai; eij ~ aij wǹa to; n mev llonta: hJ de; tautologiv a/ touton kai; tw/ oJ moiv w/ o{ rw/ aj meiv betai eij pousa o{ ti: tauj to; kaj moi; oJ kuv riov ~ mou. 55en he confessed to her fervently and spoke up: 'From now on you are my true and genuine spouse, my lady and sister, and my companion for life both now and in the life to come.'And she responded to him with the same words and with a similar definition: 'The same is true for me as well, my lord.' In this passage the young saint outlines his vision for a chaste marriage and his bride signals her agreement.The unanimity of the couple is reinforced on the formal level in the clauses that introduce the two statements: they both contain twentyone syllables.The parallelism is most obvious in the elements aj nafqev ggetai eij pwv n and aj meiv betai eij pousa, which both consist of seven syllables, but it extends also to the first parts of the two clauses: the two correlated expressions tautologiv a/ and tw/ oJ moiv w/ o{ rw/ each take up a part of the preceding verb prosomologei, which signals to the readers that tautoand oJ mo-, as well as lov go~ and o{ ro~, are synonymous, and thus suggests an equivalence between oJ mologiv a and tautologiv a.This is a clear example of how Methodius provides his readers with clues that help them make sense of his writings.I would therefore argue that in the Life of Euthymius, too, the readers are meant to consider wJ molov ghtai as equivalent to tautolov ghtai.Late Antique rhetorical treatises define tautologiv a 53 I would argue that Methodius has even construed an immediate context that would make his readers aware of such a possibility: in the first half of the sentence the uiJ ov ~ was referred to as lov go~, which allows us to rephrase tw' / uiJ w' / wJ molov ghtai as tw/ ' lov gw/ wJ molov ghtai and thus emphasises the fact that oJ mologei' n is derived from lov go~.This reading has at least some basis in the conventional use of the verb oJ mologeiǹ, which does not only have the meaning 'to confess' but can also be used in the sense of 'correspond' or 'conform', cf.Liddell & Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford, 1968), s.v.oJ mologev w. 54 Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 33, ed.Gouillard, p. 67, l. 671: th' ~ mia' ~ fuv sewv ~ te kai; tauj toousiov thto~, and p. 69, l. 695: to; tauj toouv sion kai; oJ mofue; ~ kai; ij sobouv lhton.
as 'a setting side by side of words that mean the same thing, as when we say "they are fast and swift"' (lev xewn ... tauj to; shmainouswǹ parav llhlo~ qev si~ wJ ~ eij lev goimen oj xei` eij si kai; tacei`). 56Therefore one can conclude that Methodius regards the terms lov go~ and pneu' ma as synonymous. 57t this point we can sum up the results of the discussion so far: Methodius has eroded all markers of the individuality of the third person of the Trinity and he may well have done the same as regards the second person.This means that there are still two persons, but they can both be called and characterised in the same way.It is evident that this deconstruction of traditional Trinitarian theology also removes the basis for the notion of an Imago Trinitatis in the human being, since there are no longer functionally distinguishable entities at the level of the divinity for which the human mind, speech and breath could serve as an analogy. 58his raises the question: why would Methodius have embarked on such an extraordinary course?In order to find an answer I will now extend the discussion to the context in which he develops his Trinitarian speculation.This context is a defence of religious imagery against the Iconoclasts.In his argument Methodius starts with a belief that both Iconophiles and Iconoclasts have in common, namely that the written and spoken word is an acceptable vehicle for transporting Christian belief, and then tries to show that word and image are equivalent so that acceptance of one necessarily entails acceptance of the other.This argument is summed up in the following statement: wJ ~ ga; r oJ lov go~ eij kw; n tou' nohv mato~ -ta; ga; r ej nnohqev nta uJ pofaiv nei kai; diadeiv knusin -ou{ tw~ kai; hJ eij kw; n lov go~ tou' prwtotuv pou kaqiv statai dia; grafh' ~ bow' sa tou' aj rcetuv pou ta; ij diwv mata. 59 the word is the image of the thought -for it reveals and shows what has been thought -thus the image is also the word of the prototype, proclaiming the idioms of the archetype. 56Cf.Phoebammo, De figuris, 1.3, ed C. Walz, Rhetores Graeci, vol.8 (Stuttgart, 1835), pp.487-519. 57In the discussion so far I have considered the meanings of the verb wJ molov ghtai and its possible variant tautolov ghtai in isolation.However, we must also ask whether such an interpretation can make sense in the context of the relative clause o{ per ei| " qeo; " su; n tw' / patri; kai; tw' / uiJ w' / wJ molov ghtai of which it is a part.At first sight the syntax seems to be straightforward: the element ei| " qeov " is the subject of wJ molov ghtai, and the datives tw' / patriv and tw' / uiJ w' / are correlated through kaiv and therefore both dependent on the preceding preposition suv n.However, this is not the only possible reading because one could see two different statements here, namely o{ per ei| " qeo; " su; n tw' / patriv (sc.ej sti) and o{ per ... tw' / uiJ w' / wJ molov ghtai, because in the sense of 'correspond' the verb oJ mologeiǹ is construed with the simple dative.Of course, it is impossible to prove beyond doubt that this interpretation is correct but given Methodius' subtle manipulations in the first part of the subordinate clause we should be reluctant to stop in this case at the superficial level of meaning. 58This may, however, not be as much of a contradiction as it first seems: here we need to remember that Methodius had always presented his distinction in terms of operations ad extra. 59Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 32, ed.Gouillard, p. 67, ll.658-660.
The exegesis of Genesis 1:26, which we have been discussing so far, is then introduced as Biblical corroboration of this claim.As we have seen in our analysis of this exegesis, Methodius defines the eij kwv n of God in man not only as lov go~ but as lov go~ in conjunction with nou` and aj eriv a oJ lkhv .However, he does not lose sight of the point that he is trying to prove as can be seen from the following statement that he makes in the course of his exegesis: to; kata; th; n qeiv an eij kov na doqe; n hJ mi' n kai; dhmiourghqe; n logiko; n tou' oij keiv ou noo; ~ wJ ~ gennhv toro~ uJ pofaiv nei ta; ej ktupwv mata kai; profora' / th' / dia; glwv ssh~ ej pi; to; n aj kouv onta metadiv dwsin pneuv mato~ oJ lkh' / kai; plhv xei th' / aj eriv w/ tupoumev nou. 60e 'wordliness', that has been created and has been given to us according to the divine image shows the impressions of the mind as begetter and through utterance by tongue passes on to the listener the spirit that is being formed through the drawing and beating of air.Therefore it is not surprising that Methodius concludes his Trinitarian speculations with a restatement of the original hypothesis: eij kw; n ga; r oJ lov go~ kai; lov go~ hJ eij kw; n kai; e[ stin kai; diadev deiktai diexodikwtev rai~ tai' ~ uJ fhghv sesin: ej x ou| kai; hJ grafomev nh eij kw; n tw' / dia; stov mato~ lov gw/ i[ sh pev fuken. 61e word is image and the image is word and has been shown to be such through rather effusive explanations for which reason the painted image, too, is equal in nature to the word that comes out of the mouth.These passages show that Methodius makes his statements about the Trinity in order to support an argument in favour of religious imagery.However, the link between the two themes is not limited to this level; it also extends to the manner in which Methodius presents his argument and therefore can help to elucidate the reasons that caused him to ambiguate the inner-Trinitarian relations.
In order to see how this is possible we need to have a closer look at the introductory passage to the excursus about the divine image, which I have just quoted.There Methodius highlights the functional similarity between word and imageboth make manifest things that would otherwise remain hidden -but he does not make his point by introducing a third more general category such as for example 'sign'.Instead he takes the functional similarity as the starting point for attribution of the appellation eij kwv n to lov go~ and of the appellation lov go~ to eij kwv n.And in very much the same way he also does not appeal to the common trait of 'communication' but instead ascribes to eij kwv n the verb boa' n, which in its strict sense can only refer to lov go~. 62t is evident that this approach is very similar to the way in which Methodius treats lov go~ and pneu' ma in his statement about the Trinity.There, too, he starts from a functional similarity, the origin in the Father, and then applies to the lov go~ the verb probav llesqai, which in traditional Trinitarian terminology refers to the Spirit, and as I have tried to argue he also insinuates that the Spirit can be referred to as Son and Word and vice versa.In the case of lov go~ and eij kwv n the aim of Methodius' manipulations is to show that the two phenomena are equivalent.Therefore one can argue that his Trinitarian speculations have a similar purpose, namely to safeguard the unity of the Trinity.Here, too, Methodius does not establish a link between the divine persons through introduction of the divine substance as a more general category, but instead seeks to establish it through mutual attribution of 'hypostatic' characteristics to the two persons that originate in the Father.
At this point one could object that Methodius repeatedly speaks of the consubstantiality of the Trinity.However, this does not permit us to assume that he employs the concept in its traditional sense.In the concluding passage of the excursus Methodius uses the phrase i[ sh pev fuken to express the relation between lov go~ and eij kwv n.This phrase evidently conjures up the adjective ij sofuhv ~,63 which is synonymous with the term oJ mofuhv ~ that Methodius uses in the Trinitarian excursus to denote the consubstantiality of the three divine persons.This means that the two phenomena are considered to be 'consubstantial' but not by virtue of having a common substrate: the consubstantiality is rather sought in analogies at the phenomenological level.There can be no doubt that Methodius wished his readers to apply this understanding of consubstantiality to the Trinity as well because the statement about the ij sofui? a of eij kwv n and lov go~ is followed by a statement about the Son as eij kwv n, which contains the same verb pev fuken. 64III.
Methodius' speculations are so far removed from the Patristic consensus that one might consider them to be utterly idiosyncratic.However, it can be shown that they are part of a wider debate.In order to make my case I will first look at three texts from the eighth and ninth centuries, a Sermon on the icon of Mary 'the Roman', Epiphanius of Kallistratos' Life of Mary, and the Letter of the three Patriarchs to Emperor Theophilus, which contain descriptions of the appearance of Christ.In each case Christ's features are compared with those of his mother Mary: the anonymous author of the Sermon states at the end of a list of common features that 63 Methodius uses the adjective ij sofuhv ~ elsewhere in the text, cf.Life of Euthymius, 20, ed.Gouillard, p. 49, l. 397: to; ij sofue; " eJ autoi' " di' aj gaqh' " proairev sew" pneu' ma auj tou' . 64Methodius, Life of Euthymius, 35, ed.Gouillard, p. 73, ll.744-45: kai; wJ ~ e[ fhmen eij kw; n tou` qeou` tou` aj orav tou oJ qeo; ~ kai; lov go~ oJ uiJ o; ~ auj tou` pev fuken.In the remainder of this sentence the Father and the Spirit are again added to the Son to take account of the imago Trinitatis.
a specific hair colour and thus to a 'hypostatic' characteristic and not to the common properties of man as a species.This suggests that in the case of Adam, too, the author of the Letter of the Three Patriarchs locates the similarity on the level of individual appearance.Indeed, a similar 'hypostatic' understanding of Christ's relation to Adam can be found in the Questions and Answers of Anastasius of Sinai and of Pseudo-Athanasius, which date to the seventh and eighth centuries.When Anastasius responds to the question whether the resurrected will recognise each other he says that this is not possible because all men will look like Adam before the fall. 73To support this view he adds a reference to the Fathers who defined resurrection as 'the restitution to the primeval state of the first man' (th; n pro; " to; aj rcai' on tou' prwv tou aj nqrwv pou aj pokatav stasin). 74This is a telling misunderstanding, for the Fathers to whom Anastasius refers had, of course, not conceived of this restitution in terms of outward appearance. 75The shift is even more obvious in the treatment of the same question by Pseudo-Athanasius.This author also denies the possibility of mutual recognition after the resurrection and explains that we will all look 'like one man' (wJ " ei| " a[ nqrwpo"), that is, like Adam from whom we are all descended: 'each image of a man is like to the image and form and height and shape of Adam' (pa' sa aj nqrwv pou eij kw; n oJ moiv a th' ' " tou' j Ada; m eij kov no" kai; plav sew" kai; megev qou" kai; schv mato"). 76Significantly, however, he creates a further link between the appearance of the resurrection body and the appearance of Christ, which shows that we are in the presence of the same conceptual framework as is set out in the Letter of the Three Patriarchs. 77e can thus conclude that these texts reflect a coherent framework according to which the individual appearances of Christ, of Mary, and of Adam play an important rôle in defining the relation between Christ's human part and other human beings and also in conceptualising a common humanity.This raises the question: why did Methodius and some of his contemporaries no longer seek unity at the level of substance but rather at the level of hypostatic idioms or, in Patristic terms, why did they focus on the oJ mou> pov staton instead of the oJ moouv sion? 78The study of the post-Patristic discourse is still in its infancy and any attempts at explanation must therefore be provisional.Nevertheless, I would argue that the development, which resulted in Methodius' position, had already begun in the fourth century with the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocian Fathers.As is well known the Cappadocians countered Eunomius' claim that God's substance is defined by his aj gev nnhton by arguing that aj gev nnhton is merely an attribute and says nothing about God's being.In order to support their position they advocated a total disjunction between qualities and substrate.Gregory of Nazianzus, for example, stated that for a satisfactory definition of a substance one needs to know not only qualities but also the substrate 'around which' (peri; o{ ) these qualities are found, and then denied that this was possible. 79According to the philosophical terminology of the time this reduces all attributes to the status of accidents whereas the core of being becomes completely unknowable. 80Such a conceptual framework leaves no room for the traditional Aristotelian view that specific differences are constitutive of substance and are therefore not to be equated with mere accidents. 81This disjunction had a decisive influence on later discussions, as can be seen in a famous passage in Leontius of Byzantium's Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos where ouj siv a is juxtaposed with sumbebhkov ~ and the latter is defined as 'all qualitites, both those, which are called substantial, and those, which are called para-substantial' (pasai aiJ poiov thte~ ai{ te ouj siwv dei~ kai; ej pousiwv dei~ kalouv menai). 82In the seventh and eighth centuries the assimilation of substantial qualities to accidents was taken even further.In his Ambigua Maximus restates the Cappadocian position that 'the multitude of that which is seen around them is not sufficient for the complete knowledge of things' (ouj k aj rkei' pro; " teleiv an gnw' sin tw' n pragmav twn to; plh' qo" tw' n peri; auj ta; qewroumev nwn) and then continues with the statement that 'as regards being-itself no being is that which is and is referred to as the aggregate of the things that we think of or refer to as around it; but that around which those things are is something else apart from them' (ouj de; n to; suv nolon tw' n o[ ntwn ej sti; kat' auj to; to; ei\ nai o{ per ej sti; kai; lev getai to; a[ qroisma tw' n hJ mi' n peri; auj to; nooumev nwn te kai; legomev nwn aj ll' e{ terov n ti para; tau' ta to; peri; o} tau' tav ej sti). 83he term a[ qroisma, which is used here, denotes an unstructured 'heap' and had traditionally been reserved for hypostatic idioms.Porphyry, for example, states in his Isagoge that 'such things are called individuals because each of them is made up of idioms whose aggregate could not ever come into being in another one identically' (a[ toma ou\ n lev getai ta; toiau' ta o{ ti ej x ij diothv twn sunev sthken e{ kaston w| n to; a[ qroisma ouj k a] n ej p' a[ llou pote; to; auj to; gev noito), 84 and this definition is then reproduced in Patristic texts where hypostasis is characterised as an 'aggregate of accidents' (a[ qroisma sumbebhkov twn). 85By contrast, Maximus now applies this term to the properties of species.This shift is even more obvious in the writings of John of Damascus.In his treatise De duabus in Christo voluntatibus John states that it is impossible for a nature to exist without its natural idioms, which constitute it and which distinguish it from the other natures, and then adds the comment 'the aggregate of which will not be seen in another species' (w| n to; a[ qroisma ej n eJ tev rw/ ouj qewrhqhv setai ei[ dei). 86Here this definition of nature is immediately followed by the traditional definition of hypostasis as being constituted and distinguished from other hypostases through hypostatic idioms 'the aggregate of which cannot be seen in another hypostasis' (w| n to; a[ qroisma ej f' eJ tev ra" uJ postav sew" qewrhqh' nai aj mhv cnanon). 87This sequence shows clearly that John of Damascus saw no categorical difference whatsoever between substantial and hypostatic qualities: both are unstructured assemblages.Under these circumstances it comes as no surprise that some late Patristic authors no longer define ouj siv a in Aristotelian fashion as a combination of genus and specific differences but rather give long descriptive lists.For example, in a Pseudo-Athanasian Sermon on the Annunciation, which can be dated to the eighth or to the early ninth century, the human ouj siv a is defined as the a[ qroisma of the following idioms: 'created, … intelligent, rational, animate, corporeal, passible, soluble, subject to time, mortal, capable of being born, corruptible, capable of growth, changeable, alterable, capable of feeling sorrow, and whatever else can be said equally about a human being by way of selection and analogy' (to; ktistov n ... to; noero; n to; logiko; n to; e[ myucon to; swmatiko; n to; paqhtiko; n to; rJ eusto; n to; croniko; n to; qnhto; n to; gennhto; n to; fqarto; n to; auj xhtiko; n to; trepto; n to; aj lloiwto; n to; luphro; n kai; o{ sa a[ lla toiauta kata; aj nalogiv an kai; ej klogismo; n ej piv sh~ ej pi; to; n a[ nqrwpon lambanov mena). 88nlike the Cappadocians, the author of the Sermon on the Annunciation use the term ouj siv a for the ouj siwv dei~ poiov thte~ and not for the substrate, which is now identified with hypostasis. 89However, this shift in the meaning of nature and hy-postasis was primarily due to the constraints of the Christological model developed by the defenders of Chalcedon and did not affect the underlying framework, which is remarkably consistent: a core of being that is beyond human understanding is juxtaposed with accidents.In this framework one can still say that some accidents can be found in all members of a species but this fact does not give these accidents a special status nor permit the conclusion that their totality forms a distinct entity: as we have seen they are nothing more than an 'aggregate' of essentially unconnected features.As a consequence, any likeness short of identity must be considered incomplete and unity can only be achieved if it includes the hypostatic dimension as well.I would argue that this is the context for Methodius' Trinitarian speculations and that his strategy of mutually attributing names and definitions to the Son and the Spirit (as well as to image and word) was a well-considered response to the erosion of the concept of substance.Although he makes his case by exploiting existing terminological ambiguities and would therefore undoubtedly have claimed that he was merely explicating what had already been implicit in traditional Trinitarian theology the solution he arrived at was clearly highly original.And yet it would have been very easy to miss this originality: indeed, Jean Gouillard, the editor of the Life of Euthymius, considered the whole passage to be derivative. 90ith this article I hope to have shown that far from being fossilised the theological discourse of the late and post-Patristic period produced new and exciting ideas.These ideas are developed within a conceptual framework whose roots can be traced back to the fourth and fifth centuries but which would itself have been completely alien to earlier theologians.around which (sc. the hypostasis) the natures are seen <and> in which (sc. the natures) the person is separated out' (th' " Cristou' proshgoriv a" ouj fuv sin aj ll' uJ pov stasin shmainouv sh" peri; h} n aiJ fuv sei" oJ rw' ntai kai; ej n ai| " to; prov swpon aj foriv zetai), cf.Leontius of Byzantium, Epilyseis, PG 86, 1928A. 90Cf.Gouillard, 'Vie d'Euthyme', p. 16.